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Abstract. Proven secure signature schemes and unconditionally secure 
authentication schemes with arbiter have been proposed. The former are 
not practical (too slow) and the latter cannot be reused. All these lim-
itations are solved in this paper by presenting a resuable conditionally 
secure authentication scheme with arbiter. The scheme is uncondition-
ally secure against denial by the sender of having sent a message (which 
signatures do not have) and conditionally secure against a receiver imper-
sonating the sender or substituting a message and conditionally secure 
against a similar fraud by the arbiter. 
1 Introduction 
One can make a proven secure signature scheme [9, 11] based on anyone way 
function. Unfortunately all proven secure signature schemes [7, 9, 1, 11, 2] are 
very impractical (to make some of them more practical the authentication tree 
could be used instead of pseudo random functions but this approach requires 
a lot of memory). So from a practical viewpoint it could be advantageous to 
use symmetric authentication schemes, however one then loses the signature 
property. In the classical notion of arbiter [8, p. 409] the arbiter has to be active 
when messages are transmitted. 
Simmons [14] introduced unconditionally secure authentication schemes with 
arbitration. From a functional viewpoint the arbiter is not active, in Simmons' 
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scheme, during the transmission of the authenticated message while in the clas-
sical notion the arbiter must be active. Desmedt and Yung [6] (see also Brickell 
and Stinson [4]) improved Simmons' scheme by protecting the receiver against 
an impersonation (substitution) attack by the arbiter. Unfortunately a.ll these 
schemes can only be used once (because otherwise they lose their security) and 
hence new keys have to be distributed for each new message as in a one time 
pad. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a practical proven secure conditional 
authentication scheme with arbitration. Our scheme has some similarities with 
[10], however our scheme is non-interactive and the keys can be re-used. 
2 Definitions 
Let us call S the sender, R the receiver, A the arbiter, and 0 the outside op-
ponent. We can distinguish three stages in Simmons' solution [141. The three 
stages are: 
The key initialization phase in which S, R and A interact to come up with 
the necessary keys. 
The authentication phase in which R receives a message and wants to as-
certain that the message is authentic. A does not interact in this stage. 
The dispute phase in which A is requested to resolve a dispute between Sand 
R. Using some information gathered by A during the initialization phase A 
solves the dispute. 
Our scheme contains these three stages as well. 
Let us describe more precisely the threats with which we are faced. We follow 
closely Simmons's description of such threats (for the first three threats see [14]). 
The outside opponent. The outsider, 0, can try to impersonate the sender 
and/or substitute some message(s) for one sent from S to R, but which 0 
has intercepted (actively eavesdropped). 
The attack is said to be successful if and only if R accepts the message as 
authentic when it is not. 
The sender. A dishonest S can attempt to cheat by sending a message which 
R will accept as authentic, but which he can later deny having sent. 
The attack is successful if and only if the following two conditions hold. 
First, R accepts the fraudulent message, and second, in a dispute A will 
decide that the message is not authentic. 
The receiver. A dishonest R can falsely claim to have received the message M 
from S. Two sub cases can be distinguished: R never received a message at 
all, or R has received some authentic message(s) from S which he tries to 
alter. 
The attack is successful if and only if in a dispute A certifies the message as 
being authentic. 
29 
The arbiter. A dishonest A can send a message to R which R will accept as 
authentic. As in the case of the opponent's attack the arbiter can either 
choose an impersonation or a substitution attack. 
The attack is successful if and only if the message originating at A will be 
accepted by R. 
We remark that it is not A's task to force R to accept messages originating from 
S. 
The reader who is interested in formalizing the above informal definitions is 
referred to [6]. Although these definitions have been given for unconditionally 
secure schemes, they can very easily be adapted for conditionally secure ones. 
3 . The Scheme 
We use S for the sender, R for the receiver and A for the arbiter. We assume 
the existence of a conditionally proven secure authentication scheme. When we 
mention keys we assume that these (symmetric) keys were chosen according to 
a prescribed algorithm and belong to the set K. 
3.1 Distribution Phase 
Step 1 A sends S an ordered tuple (kl' k2 , ••• , kn ) of random, independently 
chosen, keys privately. 
Step 2 A chooses with uniform probability distribution a random subset, I, 
of l n/2 J indices between 1 and n and privately sends to R the tuple 
(k~, k~, ... , k~) where k~ = k, if i E I, otherwise ki = f, where f ~ K, 
(for example ( may be the empty string). 
Step 3 S privately sends a key, kn+!' to R. 
3.2 Authentication Phase 
To send a message M the sender S forms n + 1 message authentication codes 
(M ACs) by processing the message with each of the n + 1 keys, n provided by 
the arbiter and one by himself, using a proven secure authentication scheme. Call 
these MAGs MAG1,MAG2, ... , MAGn+!. The sender sends (M, MAGI, MAG2, 
... , M AGn+d where MAGi is generated using the key ki , the message M and 
the agreed authentication algorithm to R. 
To verify whether R should accept M as (probably) being authentic R pro-
ceeds as follows: if k: :f. f then R checks that M ACi is correct, and does this 
for all i, 1 $ i $ n, and additionally checks if M ACn +l also matches. If these 
l n/2J + 1 MAGs are correct R accepts M as authentic, otherwise R rejects. In 
the case R rejects R erases his keys and requests new keys unless all the MAGs 
were wrong. 
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3.3 Dispute Phase 
If a dispute occurs the receiver presents (M, M ACt, M AC2 , ••• ', M ACn ) to the 
arbiter. The arbiter will accept the message plus the M ACs as correct if among 
(M,M ACt,M AC2,"" MACn ) all those M ACs that R should have known were 
correct are indeed correct plus at least one more MAC is correct. 
4 Proof of Security 
We will use h as a security parameter so that the complexity of performing an 
attack on the underlying authentication scheme is bounded above by l/p(h) 
where p is any polynomial. We assume 5 receives feedback from R whether he 
has accepted the message M or not. 
Theorem 1. Let n in our scheme be chosen linear in h the security param-
eter. Now if a conditionally proven secure authentication scheme exists then 
our scheme is secure against a denial attack by the sender, conditionally secure 
against an attack in which the receiver, the arbiter or an outsider attempts to 
modify the message or impersonate the sender. 
Proof. The receiver's attack will not succeed as he does not know enough keys 
and the authentication scheme was assumed to be secure. A similar proof holds 
for the arbiter's and an outsider's attacks. We now consider denial by the sender. 
We do not consider M ACn +t as this was used only to protect against the arbiter. 
If the sender wishes to have a false message accepted and then deny sending 
the message he optimizes his chance of winning by adopting a game plan. He 
wants R to accept and A to reject. Now if 5 has sent i {i : 0, ... , len - 2)/2j} 
correct M ACs and n - i incorrect M ACs then R will reject the message and so 
5 loses. If 5 sends i {i : Len + 2)/2J , ... , n} correct M ACs and n - i incorrect 
M ACs then if R accepts the message as genuine then so will A and again 5 
loses. If 5 sends l n/2 J correct M ACs and n - l n/2 J incorrect M ACs, then 5 
can win if he has chosen exactly the l n/2 J M ACs that R has, R will accept but 
the arbiter will reject. There are exactly 
ways of choosing subsets of the indices of the M ACs with l n/2 J elements. 
Our assumption that 5 receives feedback from R whether a message M was 
accepted or not implies 5 can win next time if he guesses all the indices of the 
. keys, kj = f, and sends the MACis of these n - In/2J keys correctly and all 
other M ACs incorrectly. In this case R will reject the message but not erase his 
keys (so R will not ask for new keys). The probability of this suc~eeding without 
detection is also 
1 
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So the probability is negligible of an attack succeeding (even if repeated3 
polynomially many times). 0 
5 Conclusions 
We have presented an authentication scheme with arbiter which is uncondition-
ally secure against denial by the sender of having sent a message and condition-
ally secure against a receiver impersonating the sender or substituting a message 
and conditionally secure against a similar fraud by the arbiter. 
The security obtained is the same as for the symmetric authentication scheme 
on which it is based. We observe that making practical proven secure authenti-
cation schemes is easy to achieve starting from pseudo-noise generators [12, 13] 
and unconditionally secure authentication schemes [5]. 
It is clear that the scheme presented in Section 3, can be adapted for DES. 
We remind the reader that DES is not a proven secure scheme and that some 
weaknesses have been found in the protocol for generating M ACs [3]. 
Acknowledgement 
The authors thank Bart Preneel of the University of Louvain, Belgium for bring-
ing [10] to their attention. 
References 
1. Bellare, M., Goldwasser, S.: New paradigms for digital signatures and message 
authentication based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. In Advances in 
Cryptology - Crypto '89, Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 435) 
(1990) G. Brassard, Ed. Springer-Verlag pp. 194-211 
2. Bellare, M., Mica.li, S.: How to sign given any trapdoor function. Journal of the 
ACM 39 (1992) 214-233 
3. Bird, R., Gopal, 1., A.Herzberg, Jansen, P., Kutten, S., Molva, R., Yung, M.: 
Systematic design of two-party authentication protocols. In Advances in Cryptol-
ogy - Crypto '91, Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 576) (1992) 
J. Feigenbaum, Ed. Springer-Verlag pp. 44-61 
3 For the first type of attack, if the sender successfully modified i 1 M ACs the first 
time, i2 different M ACs the second time and so on. Then observing 
the numerate reader can show that the probability of successful attack remains the 
same as above. The same can be said for the second type of attack or a combination 
of both types. 
32 
4. Brickell, E. F., Stinson, D. R.: Authentication codes with multiple arbiters. In Ad-
vances in Cryptology, Proc. of Eurocrypt '88 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 
330) (May 1988) C. G. Giinther, Ed. Springer-Verlag pp. 51-55 
5. den Boer, B.: A simple and key-economical authentication scheme, March 30-April 
3, 1992. Presented at System Security, Dagstuhl, Germany 
6. Desmedt, Y., Yung, M.: Arbitrated unconditionally secure authentication can be 
unconditionally protected against arbiter's attacks. In Advances in Cryptology 
- Crypto '90, Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 537) (1991) A. J. 
Menezes and S. A. Vanstone, Eds. Springer-Verlag pp. 177-188 
7. Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., Rivest, R.: A digital signature scheme secure against 
adaptive chosen-message attacks. Siam J. Comput. 17 (1988) 281-308 
8. Meyer, C. H., Matyas, S. M.: Cryptography: A New Dimension in Computer Data 
Security. J. Wiley New York 1982 
9. Naor, M., Yung, M.: Universal one-way hash functions and their cryptographic 
applications.. In Proceedings of the twenty first annual ACM Symp. Theory of 
Computing, STOC (May 15-17, 1989) pp. 33-43 
10. Rabin, M. 0.: Digitized signatures. In Foundations of Secure Computation (New 
York, 1978) R. A. DeMilIo, D. P. Dobkin, A. K. Jones, and R. J. Lipton, Eds. 
Academic Press pp. 155-168 
11. Rompel, J.: One-way functions are necessary and sufficient for secure signatures. 
In Proceedings of the twenty second annual ACM Symp. Theory of Computing, 
STOC (May 14-16, 1990) pp. 387-394 
12. Rueppel, R. A.: Stream ciphers. In Contemporary Cryptology, G. J. Simmons, 
Ed. IEEE Press 1992 pp. 65-134 
13. Schrift, A. W., Shamir, A.: The discrete log is very discreet. In Proceedings of 
the twenty second annual ACM Symp. Theory of Computing, STOC (May 14-16, 
1990) pp. 405-415 
14. Simmons, G. J.: A Cartesian product construction for unconditionally secure au-
thentication codes that permit arbitration. Journal of Cryptology 2 (1990) 77-104 
